Easternization? A Historical Perspective by 山井, 敏章
立命館経済学 64巻６号―再校　Ａ
論　説
Easternization? A Historical Perspective
A contribution to the panel discussion : “Easternization : The Re-ascendance of 
Eastern Economy” at the 10th RICA Conference in Bangkok, November 27, 20151
Toshiaki Yamai
１．“ReORIENT”
　When I think about the topic of this panel discussion “Easternization,” I remember the 
names of three scholars. The ﬁrst is Andre Gunder Frank, a German-American economic 
historian and a sociologist. In 1998, he published a book with a very impressive title, “Re-
ORIENT” : once again the East. In this book, he insisted that Asia and in particular East 
Asia dominated the world up until two centuries ago. “Only then,” he wrote, “did Asian 
economies lose their positions of predominance in the world economy while that position 
came to be occupied by the West ― apparently only temporarily.”2 Frank investigated the 
development of the world economy after 1400 and conﬁrmed that Asia, particularly China 
and India, was preponderant not only in population and production but also in productivity 
up until 1800. This leading position shifted to Europe after the 19th century and seems now 
to be shifting back to the East3; thus, the term “ReORIENT” is used.
　To better understand Frank’s argument, I show you a chart prepared by Angus Maddi-
son, a British economist （Figure 1）.4 This chart provides an estimate of GDP per capita in 
China and West Europe from 400 to the end of the 20th century. Such an estimation for a 
very long period and made with likely insuﬃciently reliable data can provide only an ap-
proximate image of the economic development in both areas. However, the trend is clear : 
GDP per capita in China surpassed that in West Europe up to circa 1300. Subsequently, 
GDP per capita in West Europe was higher than that in China and increased signiﬁcantly 
only after 1800. When we consider the population of both areas, the dominance of China in 
the scale of the economy is much clear and longer. Moreover, Asia had an additional eco-
nomic center : India.
　With his argument of “ReORIENT,” Frank criticized a traditional “euro-centric” view of, 
for example, Karl Marx. Marx argued that the “capitalist mode of production” developed 
within and out of Europe ; the economic development and modernization of the rest of the 
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world were enabled only through European assistance and diﬀusion. For Frank, Marx was 
a representative “Orientalist” who found that Asian societies were unable to develop them-
selves through their own power.5
２．The “Modern World System” and Euro-centrism
　The second scholar whom I remember is Immanuel Wallerstein, an American sociologist 
and a historical social scientist. He is well known as the author of the world-famous book 
“The Modern World System,” whose ﬁrst volume was published in 1974. Wallerstein under-
stands world history as a process of the emergence and demise of “world systems” 
throughout the globe. What is a “world system”? Wallerstein deﬁnes it abstractly as “a unit 
with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems.”6 In more “normal” words, we 
can probably describe the “world system” as a large territorial entity with an integrated 
economy and plural ethnic groups. For example, we understand the ancient Roman Empire 
（　　）
Figure 1 : GDP Per Capita : China and West Europe, 400―1998 A. D.
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as one such world system.
　Wallerstein distinguishes two types of world systems : one with a common political sys-
tem and one without it. He calls the former a “world empire” and the latter a “world econ-
omy.” According to Wallerstein, the world economies were historically unstable structures 
that led either toward disintegration or transformation into a world empire ; as examples, 
we recall the so-called great civilizations of pre-modern times, such as China, Egypt, and 
Rome.7
　An exception exists : a world economy that developed without changing into a world em-
pire. That is, a European world economy emerged in the sixteenth century after the so-
called discovery of the New World. This world economy, ﬁrst born as a trans-Atlantic eco-
nomic zone, expanded its territory and absorbed other world systems to ultimately cover 
the entire world （Figure 2）. However, politically, this world economy did not become an 
empire but was an aggregate of many nation-states with colonial appendages. Wallerstein 
views the history of the modern world as a process of the global expansion of this Europe-
an world economy. Therefore, he calls it the Modern World System.8
　Wallerstein believes that we can ﬁnd three structural positions in the modern world sys-
tem : core, periphery, and semi-periphery. He argues that the enormous development of this 
system was enabled only on the basis of the appropriation of the surplus of the entire 
world economy by core areas.9 We should remember that the history of the formation of 
this system in the sixteenth century included the European colonization of America. Using 
this argument, Wallerstein criticizes the traditional view of the development of European 
countries in the modern world that saw the decisive factors of this development within 
Europe without considering periphery areas.10
（　　）
Figure 2 : Birth of the Modern World System in the 16th Century
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　However, for Frank, this argument is insuﬃcient. He criticized Wallerstein for still seeing 
the modern world system as centered in Europe and expanding from there to increasingly 
incorporate the rest of the world in its own European-based “world” economy. For Frank, 
Wallerstein is still not freed from Euro-centrism such as Marx, Sombart, Toynbee, Polanyi, 
and Braudel.11 Another prominent representative of these Euro-centric Orientalists for 
Frank is Max Weber, a giant of modern social science and the third and last scholar in 
my speech.
３．“Rational” and the Emergence of the Modern World
　In the opening paragraph of the introduction of his monumental work on the “Sociology 
of Religion,” published in 1920, Weber expressed his core interests as follows:
　“What chain of factors has led to the fact that on the soil of Occident, and only here, 
cultural phenomena emerged, which was in a development direction of universal impor-
tance and validity.”12
　Conversely, in the rest of the world, such as in Asia, no cultural phenomenon emerged 
that was in a development direction of universal importance and validity. Such a statement 
sounds “Orientalist.” When we think of the economic development of Asian countries in the 
last few decades, Weber’s argument appears completely distorted or simply incorrect. How-
ever, before discarding him as an Orientalist, we examine his argument.
　The fact that Weber saw in “rationality” the most basic and prominent character of the 
modern European culture is well known. He classiﬁes several types of rationalities. Howev-
er, we do not have time to go into the details and must concentrate on the main element 
of “rationality.” What is being “rational”?
　To understand the meaning of “rational” in Weber’s argument, I show you two pictures. 
The ﬁrst picture is of a world-famous painting by Leonardo da Vinci （Figure 3）.13 This 
picture is painted using the perspective method. We ﬁnd a small peg hole on the temple of 
Jesus. The painter was thought to have stretched several strings from this hole to decide 
on the position and size of the characters and furniture in the picture. Perhaps, we can 
paint a similar picture such as that of Leonardo ― of course, not a masterpiece ― but a 
picture only with a similar composition.
　We regard the perspective method as a rule that we should follow if we want to place 
objects in a picture at the “correct” size and position. In other words, the size and position 
of objects in a picture can be “predictable” when we follow the rule. This “predictability” is 
the core essence of “rationality” in Weber’s argument. Related to “rationality,” he repeatedly 
used the German word “berechenbar”14: in English, it means “countable” or “predictable.”
　I show you one more picture （Figure 4）,15 which was painted by a Japanese woodblock 
（　　）
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artist from the 18th and 19th centuries, Hokusai Katsushika. In particular, he is famous for a 
series of woodblock prints of Mt. Fuji. Compared with his marvelous paintings of Mt. Fuji, 
the picture of the theater scene is no masterpiece and gives us a strange impression. 
Why?
　As you easily ﬁnd, this picture uses the perspective method. However, we are perplexed 
when we attempt to ﬁnd a “peg hole on the temple of Jesus” in this picture. We can likely 
ﬁnd several “peg holes” or ― using the correct word ― vanishing points, which are not well 
adjusted. Hokusai, a painter of full curiosity, attempted to introduce the European painting 
method into his work but ― in this case ― without much success. An experiment in unit-
ing the Japanese and European painting styles ends with a strange picture.
　As you know, the perspective method was developed in the Renaissance age after the 
15th century, ﬁrst in Italy and then in other areas in Europe. With Max Weber, we call this 
method “rational” because it provides paintings with a high level of “predictability.” Accord-
ing to Weber, such “rationalization” occurred in Europe not only in paintings but also in 
（　　）
Figure 3 : The Last Supper （Leonardo da Vinci）
Figure 4 : A Theater Scene （Hokusai Katsushika）
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music, architecture, natural and social sciences, politics, the economy, and others.16 The en-
tire society was involved in a wave of “rationalization”― an epochal change in the 16th and 
17th centuries in Europe. For Weber, this change led to the emergence of the modern 
world.
　The diﬀerence in views between Andre Gunder Frank and Weber is clear. Frank argues 
only about economic development in Asia and West Europe. Weber knew well that pre-
modern Asia had a high level of economic activity. He wrote that “‘capitalism’ and ‘capital-
istic companies’ existed in all civilized areas on earth ; in China, India, Babylon, Egypt, the 
Mediterranean ancient world, the Middle Ages, as good as in the modern age.”17 “Capital-
ism” means simply a monetary economy. However, Weber simultaneously states that the 
Occident created a completely diﬀerent type of capitalism in the modern age. He deﬁnes 
this capitalism as, for example, “the rational-capitalistic organization of （formally） free la-
bor.”18 What is that? Can we really distinguish between pre-modern and modern capital-
ism? At this time, I cannot discuss this controversial topic from the studies on Max Weber. 
Instead, I want to consider another critical topic in Weber’s argument : the “universal” 
meaning of an Occidental civilization that I previously mentioned.
４．“Universal” Meaning of European Culture?
　Let me cite once again the words of Weber:
　“What chain of factors has led to the fact that on the soil of Occident, and only here, 
cultural phenomena emerged, which was in a development direction of universal impor-
tance and validity.”
　For many people, this sentence is nothing but a pronounced expression of Weber’s Ori-
entalism that denies Asian societies the ability to develop by themselves. However, let me 
ask whether Weber’s argument is truly groundless. If it is not, we must seek possible rea-
sons for why the Occident and not Asia is able to create a culture with a “universal” 
meaning.
　One reason may be found in the economic and military power of European countries in 
the modern world. This power enabled these countries to put the rest of the world under 
their dominance, not only economically and politically but also culturally ; the global domi-
nance of Europe has made its culture “universal.”
　However, I believe that we can perhaps ﬁnd another answer and hints for it in Weber’s 
argument on “rationality.” In his study on Confucianism and Taoism, Weber wrote ; “The 
personalistic restriction of “Versachlichung” has a signiﬁcant importance as restriction of 
objective rationalization ［…］ because the personalistic restriction has tendency to tie each 
individual to clans or members of clan-like groups, at any rate to ‘persons’, and not to ob-
（　　）
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jective tasks.”19
　The German word “Versachlichung” is the nominalization of the verb “versachlichen,” 
which can be translated as “objectivize” or “depersonalize.” “Making a relationship between 
people into a business-like one” can be the meaning of this word. A business-like relation-
ship can be more “rational” than a “personalistic” or clan-like human relationship. Why? We 
should recall Weber’s argument on “rationality” and “predictability.” In a “personalistic” re-
lationship, arbitral decisions by a person are frequently of signiﬁcant inﬂuence. We think of 
a despot in a despotic regime. Alternatively, let us think about a family with a despotic fa-
ther. Their decisions are often arbitral and therefore unpredictable ; in Weber’s meaning, 
they are “irrational.”20
　Perhaps you have a counterargument. Are decisions by a despotic father truly unpredict-
able? Not always ; at least for family members, decisions by their father are even more 
predictable than decisions by, for example, customers from their business connections. How-
ever, “at least for family members” is the important point. The predictability of a despotic 
father is high only for a restricted circle of persons ; in this sense, we can say that the 
predictability （or rationality） cannot be “universal.”
　Please recall what I talked regarding the perspective presentation in Renaissance paint-
ings. This method can be considered to be a rule that restricts arbitrariness in composing 
a picture and, in this sense, brings European paintings a high level of “predictability” and 
therefore “rationality.” Indeed, paintings in the rest of the world, such as Asian paintings, 
have their own rules. However, the European rule seems to be prominent in terms of its 
clearness and objectiveness ; therefore, it presumably has an inherent quality to be open 
not only to people in Europe but also to people of other parts of the world. The dissemina-
tion of classical European music today seems to oﬀer another example of this “universal” 
character of European culture. Compared with the European music, traditional music in 
other areas of the world normally remains “special” in its own area and is often accepted 
from outside as “exotic” music.
　Now, we turn back to the title of our panel discussion. When we talk regarding the 
“Easternization” or “Re-ascendance” of Asia, our discussion seems frequently too concentrat-
ed on the economy. I wonder if Asia has really succeeded in establishing a social system 
with a “universal” meaning. I do not mean that we should abandon our own cultures. I 
love traditional Japanese and Asian music and pictures. However, we know that Asian 
countries still signiﬁcantly suﬀer from arbitrariness in politics, economics, and business ad-
ministration. Frequently, this arbitrariness disturbs not only the sound development of each 
country. The lack of “predictability” or “rationality” can also be a barrier for establishing a 
better partnership among Asian countries. My message is that we should not be too much 
of an economist.
（　　）
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